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Example Using Prominent Studies of
Racial Bias
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In response to concerns about the validity of empirical findings in psychology, some
scientists use replication studies as a way to validate good science and to identify
poor science. Such efforts are resource intensive and are sometimes controversial (with
accusations of researcher incompetence) when a replication fails to show a previous
result. An alternative approach is to examine the statistical properties of the reported
literature to identify some cases of poor science. This review discusses some details of
this process for prominent findings about racial bias, where a set of studies seems “too
good to be true.” This kind of analysis is based on the original studies, so it avoids criticism
from the original authors about the validity of replication studies. The analysis is also much
easier to perform than a new empirical study. A variation of the analysis can also be used
to explore whether it makes sense to run a replication study. As demonstrated here, there
are situations where the existing data suggest that a direct replication of a set of studies is
not worth the effort. Such a conclusion should motivate scientists to generate alternative
experimental designs that better test theoretical ideas.
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INTRODUCTION
The last 5 years have been brutal for psychology. A high profile case of fraud (Stapel and Lindenberg,
2011) led to claims that the field should have recognized many deficiencies in the reported findings
(Levelt et al., 2012). At around the same time, one of the top journals in the field published a
series of experiments purportedly showing evidence of precognition: that people could acquire
information from the future and use it in the present (Bem, 2011). While this case did not seem to
be due to fraud, it became a poster child for a set of improper methods in scientific investigations
that sometimes go by the term p-hacking (Simmons et al., 2011) or questionable research practices
KEY CONCEPT 1 | Questionable Research Practices:
Researchers often have an opportunity to adjust the sampling procedure, modify the data analysis, selectively report some
findings, or adjust their theoretical ideas after observing the data. This kind of flexibility sometimes undermines the validity
of the conclusions derived from the data.
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(QRPs, John et al., 2012). These methods violate the rules of
data collection, reporting, or statistical analysis, and thereby
potentially undermine the conclusions derived from the reported
empirical data.
Some concerned scientists have taken an empirical approach
to the perceived crisis in psychology. A series of new experiments
have attempted to repeat well-known empirical studies to
judge whether the reported effects are robust. There have been
notable successes (e.g., Röer et al., 2013) but equally notable
failures to replicate important findings (Doyen et al., 2012;
Galak et al., 2012; Shanks et al., 2013; Johnson et al., 2014;
Ranehill et al., 2015). Even when replications find evidence
for an effect, it is often determined to be much smaller than
the original report (e.g., Alogna et al., 2014). In one large-
scale effort, the Open Science Collaboration (2015) attempted
to replicate 97 prominent experimental outcomes, but was only
able to meet the traditional criterion for statistical significance
KEY CONCEPT 2 | Statistical Significance:
A somewhat arbitrary conclusion about the existence of an effect (e.g., a
difference in population means) based on observing an empirical result (e.g.,
a difference of sample means) that would be rather unusual if there were no
effect.
in 25% of the social psychology experiments (cognitive
psychology did better with a still disappointing 50% success rate).
There is undeniable value in these empirical investigations,
but they are expensive in terms of time and effort (for both
scientists and participants). Moreover, proponents of the original
findings often complain that the replicators messed up the
experiment (Schnall, 2014); and this criticism is sometimes
levied even when the proponents approved the replication
KEY CONCEPT 3 | Replication:
An effort to reproduce experimental conditions, measurements, and analyses
to further explore or verify a previous study. Success is usually determined
according to whether the new experiment generates results with the same
general properties as the original study. When experimental outcomes are
based on statistics, success is necessarily a probabilistic property.
design (Baumeister and Vohs, 2016). Such charges can be difficult
to refute because the original studies often do not fully describe
the necessary conditions for producing an effect. Because of these
issues, using empirical investigations to sort out the literature
is a daunting task. Indeed, even the large scale Open Science
Collaboration (2015) only replicated a single experiment from
papers that often had multiple studies.
As part of the perceived crisis, scientists have gained a better
understanding about how various types of biases can undermine
their theoretical claims. Unfortunately, with this knowledge the
story about some past research seems to only get worse. Lane et al.
(2016) reported that when they analyzed both their published
and (previously) unpublished studies on the effects of oxytocin
the main effect appeared to be non-existent. Using new types of
meta-analyses (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2014) that take into
account the influence of publication bias, Carter andMcCullough
(Carter and McCullough, 2014) found no support for the “ego-
depletion effect” (the idea that one has a limited resource for
self-control). A large-scale, pre-registered, multi-site replication
investigation concluded that if the ego-depletion effect exists,
then it is extremely tiny (Hagger et al., 2015). As a center-piece
of many theories of social cognition, this negative finding led
Inzlicht (2016), who has based some of his work on the theory, to
conclude, “I feel like the ground is moving from underneath me,
and I no longer know what is real and what is not.” He continued,
“During my dark moments, I feel like social psychology needs a
redo, a fresh start. Where to begin, though?”
A purely experimental approach does not seem like a
reasonable way to begin a fresh start to the field because setting
up replications for an entire field would be a daunting task and
would take up so many resources as to essentially halt any other
kind of research. A more practical beginning is to judge the
quality of past findings by looking for inconsistencies in a set of
findings; but identifying these inconsistencies requires a nuanced
understanding about the relation between experimental results
and theoretical conclusions. The conclusions about findings from
an empirical study often depend on statistical significance as a
criterion for “success.” From this perspective, a failure to show
significance is cause for concern and casts doubt on the existence
of an effect. This concern is valid, but one also has to consider
that some empirical failures are expected because every study
has a random component (typically in selecting a sample of
participants). Because experimental failures are expected, their
absence can indicate problems in reporting, sampling, or analysis
of a set of empirical findings. For example, Francis (2012a)
and Schimmack (2012) used statistical analyses to show that
Bem’s precognition studies seemed “too good to be true.” This
kind of analysis, called the Test for Excess Success (TES),
KEY CONCEPT 4 | Test for Excess Success:
A statistical analysis that uses findings from a set of experiments to estimate
the probability that a direct replication would reproduce the same pattern of
successful outcomes. When the probability is low, the analysis raises doubts
about the validity of the original experiment set.
uses the reported data to estimate the probability of success
for replication experiments with the same design and sample
size(s). If this success probability is low, then scientists should
be skeptical about the validity of the original findings. Systematic
investigations with the TES analysis revealed that over 80%
of articles with four or more experiments in two high-profile
journals had problems similar to Bem’s precognition studies
(Francis, 2014a; Francis et al., 2014). For a single article, a TES
analysis can often be completed in an afternoon, which is several
orders of magnitude faster and easier than running empirical
replications of a set of studies.
There may be little motivation to perform a TES analysis
for findings with little impact. Scientists get the most benefit
by doing a TES analysis (or an empirical replication study)
that examines findings and theories that have influenced the
field either by motivating research on important topics or by
encouraging applications. Francis (2015) presented one such
TES analysis that looked at several prominent papers (Eberhardt
et al., 2004; Goff et al., 2008; Williams and Eberhardt, 2008) that
investigated properties of racial bias on perception. The findings
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and claims in these papers have been widely publicized as having
important implications for understanding racial bias (MacArthur
Foundation, 2014; Dreifus, 2015; Noë, 2015), and they have been
part of training programs used by police departments to better
understand and mitigate racial bias (Laszlo and Fridell, 2012).
Rather than simply repeat the TES analysis in Francis (2015),
here I want to look in detail at one of the experiments and
discuss the relationship between the empirical findings and
the theoretical conclusions. A similar kind of analysis indicates
that, based on the information in the original experiments,
replications of the studies in Eberhardt et al. (2004) are unlikely
to be fruitful even if the sample sizes are dramatically increased.
ESTIMATING AN EXPERIMENT’S
SUCCESS PROBABILITY
An important aspect in determining success probability is the
definition of “success.” In many scientific reports success for
empirical experiments is relative to the final theoretical claims
that are based on those experimental results. Thus, to create a
TES analysis for an experiment one must identify the theoretical
claims of the experiment. Fortunately, in many cases, the
original manuscript is clear about the theoretical claims; indeed,
identification of those claims is often themain point of a scientific
article.
In study 1 from Eberhardt et al. (2004), participants were
exposed to one of three subliminal priming conditions: white face
priming, black face priming, or no face priming. After the prime
exposure, participants were asked to identify outline shapes that
were embedded in visual noise. The noise was gradually reduced
with successive image frames, and the dependent variable was the
number of frames presented before the participant reported that
they could see the shape. Across trials, the object was sometimes
crime-relevant (e.g., a gun or a knife) and other times crime-
irrelevant (e.g., a camera or a book). Based on their analysis
of the data, Eberhardt et al. (2004) concluded, “both Black and
White primes tune the detection of crime-relevant objects, yet in
opposite directions” (p. 881).
Figure 1 breaks down the theoretical claims of Eberhardt et al.
(2004) into three statements and identifies the seven statistical
tests they used to support those claims.
1. Black face racial priming increases sensitivity to crime-relevant
objects. This claim is based on three statistically significant
hypothesis tests. One test compared the number of frames
for detection of crime-relevant objects for white-prime and
black-prime participants. A second test compared the number
of frames for detection of crime-relevant objects for black-
prime and no-prime participants. A third (within-subjects)
test compared the number of frames for detection of black-
prime participants for crime-relevant objects against crime-
irrelevant objects. Eberhardt et al. (2004) described this
particular claim as a prediction based on their hypothesis that
stereotypic associations influence visual processing.
2. White face racial priming decreases sensitivity to crime-
relevant objects. This claim is based on three statistically
significant hypothesis tests. One test compared the number
of frames for detection of crime-relevant objects for white-
prime and black-prime participants. A second test compared
the number of frames for detection of crime-relevant objects
for white-prime and no-prime participants. A third (within-
subjects) test compared the number of frames for white-
prime participants for detection of crime-relevant objects
against crime-irrelevant objects. Eberhardt et al. (2004) did
not report that their hypothesis predicted this relationship, but
it nevertheless is a (narrow) theoretical claim about stereotypic
associations and visual processing in this kind of study.
for crime-relevant objects.
  Black face racial priming increases sensitivity to crime-relevant objects.
  White face racial priming reduces sensitivity to crime-relevant objects.
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FIGURE 1 | The three theoretical claims and the seven hypothesis tests used to support those claims in study 1 of Eberhardt et al. (2004).
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 September 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1382
Francis Too Good to Be True
In particular, although other studies did not report finding
a similar relationship for white priming, those different
outcomes were attributed to methodological differences in
stimuli and tasks rather than being due to noise from random
sampling, and this interpretation forms part of the theoretical
claims in Eberhardt et al. (2004) about this experiment.
3. Racial priming is specifically for crime-relevant objects. This
claim is based on two significant and two non-significant
hypothesis tests. The significant tests were for differences
between the black-prime and no-prime conditions and
between the white-prime and no-prime conditions for the
crime-relevant objects. The non-significant tests compared
differences between the black-prime and no-prime conditions
and between the white-prime and no-prime conditions for
crime-irrelevant objects. Although it is somewhat unusual
to base theoretical conclusions on null results, Eberhardt
et al. (2004) are specific about the role of these tests, “As
predicted, there was no significant effect of race prime on
crime-irrelevant objects” (p. 880).
So, success for study 1 of Eberhardt et al. (2004) required five
significant outcomes and two non-significant outcomes. If any
of these outcomes were unsuccessful, it would call in to doubt
at least some of the theoretical claims made by Eberhardt et al.
(2004). Of course, just due to random sampling, one would not
always expect all of these outcomes to be successful. A TES
analysis estimates the probability that an experiment like this one
would produce full success (significance or non-significance, as
appropriate) across all the tests.
An estimate of the success probability of all the outcomes in
study 1 of Eberhardt et al. (2004) was computed by simulated
experiments that use the reported sample means, standard
deviations, and correlations (of within-subject measures) as
representative of population values. In the simulations 100,000
experiment samples were drawn from normal distributions with
the same sample sizes (13, 12, and 14 subjects for the white-
prime, no-prime, and black-prime conditions, respectively) as
study 1 of Eberhardt et al. (2004); and these samples were then
subjected to the tests identified in Figure 1. Each of the 10 dashed
lines in Figure 2 plots the means for the various conditions that
were generated by one simulated experiment. The black solid
line with large symbols corresponds to the means reported by
Eberhardt et al. (2004). As is to be expected with such small
sample sizes, the simulated means vary quite a bit around the
originally reported means. Moreover, there is so much variability
that oftentimes the significance status “flips” for one or more
of the tests. Only one simulated experiment in Figure 2 had
full success; it corresponds to the peach-colored dashed line.
Out of the 100,000 simulated experiments, only 16,294 produced
success for all seven statistical tests identified in Figure 1. Thus,
if the population means and standard deviations are similar
to those reported by Eberhardt et al. (2004), then experiments
like these have an estimated success rate of around 0.163. R
source code for these simulations is available in the Supplemental
Material.
This low estimated success rate indicates that, based on the
available data, it is rather unlikely that a replication study with
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FIGURE 2 | Ten simulated experimental findings for study 1 of
Eberhardt et al. (2004). The x- and y-axes correspond to the sample mean
value for the crime-relevant and crime-irrelevant conditions, respectively. The
different symbols correspond to the different priming conditions, as indicated
in the legend. A line connects points from the same simulated experiment. The
solid black line with large symbols corresponds to the findings reported by
Eberhardt et al. (2004).
the same sample sizes will produce the pattern of results that
Eberhardt et al. (2004) used to support their theoretical claims.
ESTIMATING SUCCESS FOR A SET OF
EXPERIMENTS
The general conclusions in Eberhardt et al. (2004) were based
on not just the outcomes from study 1, but also from an
additional four experiments. As Eberhardt et al. (2004) noted at
the beginning of their general discussion, “Across five studies, we
have shown that bidirectional associations between social groups
and concepts can guide how people process stimuli in their visual
environment” (p. 889).
The same kind of success rate estimation process can be
applied to the other four experiments in Eberhardt et al. (2004),
and it finds estimated success rates of 0.380, 0.575, 0.450, and
0.212 for experiments 2–5, respectively. Only study 3 has a better
than 50% chance of a replication study being fully successful; and
study 5 has only around a 20% chance of producing results that
fully agree with the outcomes described in Eberhardt et al. (2004).
Details of the analyses and R source code are in Francis (2015).
This analysis suggests that none of these experiments were
well crafted to provide empirical support for the theoretical
ideas described in Eberhardt et al. (2004). Given the expected
low success rates across all the experiments, it is rather
surprising that every experiment was fully successful. Indeed,
since the experiments were derived from independent samples,
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the probability of full success across all five studies is the product
of the success probabilities, 0.003, which indicates that full
success across all five experiments should be a very uncommon
outcome.
In their general discussion, Eberhardt et al. (2004) noted
that, “We found remarkably consistent support for both visual
tuning and bidirectionality using three different paradigms that
incorporated three different types of participant judgments
as well as both image and word stimuli, both student and
police officer participant populations, both positive and negative
concepts, and both explicit and implicit measures” (p. 889). The
TES analysis suggests that the support is not just “remarkably
consistent” but “shockingly consistent,” and perhaps even
“unbelievably consistent.” Given the variability that should be
present simply due to random sampling, the uniform success
across all five experiments reported by Eberhardt et al. (2004) is
rather unbelievable. To the astute reader it suggests a problem
with the sampling procedures, a problem with the analyses, or a
problem of not reporting the unsuccessful studies or outcomes
that almost surely occurred. Regardless of the cause, readers
should be skeptical about the theoretical claims that are based on
this set of experiments.
Francis (2015) performed similar calculations for two other
papers that addressed similar topics (Goff et al., 2008; Williams
and Eberhardt, 2008) and found similar estimates of low success
rates: 0.048 and 0.07, respectively. Readers are advised to be
skeptical of the theoretical claims that were based on the reported
findings in those studies.
WHAT HAPPENED IN THESE STUDIES?
It is important to recognize the specific criticism derived from
the TES analysis: it is that the empirical findings seem too
successful to plausibly support the theoretical claims. Excluding
the possibility of a chance occurrence, one can interpret the
seeming excess success by supposing that there are flaws in the
empirical findings (sampling or reporting problems) or flaws in
the development of the theoretical claims (HARKing or model
over fitting to data). In either case, a replication study that used
proper sampling and reporting to test the theoretical claims with
the same tests and sample sizes is unlikely to support the full set
of claims.
The problems with the findings in Eberhardt et al. (2004)
seem representative of problems across the broad field of social
psychology. As noted in the introduction, scientists often seem
to use a variety of QRPs to convince themselves that their data
support their theoretical ideas. The TES analysis can identify the
presence of these approaches, but cannot identify what kind of
QRPs were used for a particular data set. It is important to note
that use of a QRP is not fraud. As Gelman and Loken (2014)
noted, it is possible for scientists to introduce QRPs without
realizing it.
Indeed, some standard approaches to science seem to
encourage some types of QRPs. For example, a common scientific
attitude is to “follow the data” when generating theoretical claims,
but this is actually poor advice in many situations. Consider a
hypothetical outcome for the findings in study 1 of Eberhardt
et al. (2004) where (contrary to what was actually reported)
for crime-relevant objects the participants in the white-prime
condition do not show a priming effect that differs from the
participants in the no-prime condition. A scientist observing
such a pattern might conclude that although black-priming
increases sensitivity to crime-related objects, white-priming has
no effect in either direction. This theoretical claim differs
from the claims made in Eberhardt et al. (2004) because the
hypothetical data are different.
Although it might seem like good science to build a theory
solely on observed data, using this approach the conclusions
derived from the data tend to fit noise (due to random sampling)
in the data as well as any signal. A model or theory that perfectly
fits empirical data (in this case at the level of significant or non-
significant outcomes) tends to “over fit” the data by proposing a
theoretical basis for noise. Such a theory will not do a good job
predicting future data because the random noise in a new data
set will be different than the noise in the original data set.
Returning to the various outcomes of the white-priming
effect; given the reported data, the estimated probability of
significance for the t-test comparing the white-prime and no-
prime conditions (for crime-relevant objects) is around 0.54. This
means that due to random sampling, replication experiments of
this type will draw different conclusions almost equally often.
If one believes that empirical findings should replicate in order
to support a theoretical claim, this randomness suggests that
researchers should not have much confidence in the theoretical
conclusion derived from this test.
TRYING TO IMPROVE THE EXPERIMENTS
IN Eberhardt et al. (2004)
When doubts are raised about a set of empirical findings, a
common approach in psychological science is to run a new
experiment. It might seem that a good way to test the theoretical
claims in study 1 of Eberhardt et al. (2004) would be to
run the same experiment with a larger sample size. Indeed,
when empirical support for a theoretical claim is based on a
significant hypothesis test, larger samples increase the power
KEY CONCEPT 5 | Power:
In a hypothesis test, power is the probability of picking a random sample that
produces a statistically significant outcome. The power calculation requires
specification of an effect size, experimental design, and sample size(s).
of the test, so that the study is more likely to find an effect if it
exists. However, when the theoretical claims are based on both
significant and non-significant tests, there may be limits to the
maximum probability of success. These limits for study 1 were
investigated with simulated experiments that used the means,
standard deviations, and correlations reported by Eberhardt et al.
(2004) as population values and varied the sample size for each
prime condition. (R source code for the simulations is in the
Supplemental Material). The colored lines in Figure 3 plot the
estimated probability of success for each of the seven tests used by
Eberhardt et al. (2004) as a function of sample size (assuming the
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same sample size for each priming condition). For the five tests
where success corresponds to producing a significant result, the
probability of success increases with sample size and converges
on the maximum value of 1 at around a sample size of 50. For
the two tests where success corresponds to producing a non-
significant result, the probability of success decreases with sample
size (because some random samples show significant differences).
The black line in Figure 3 indicates the probability of all seven
tests being successful (significant or non-significant as needed),
and the black diamond indicates the average sample size used by
Eberhardt et al. (2004). For this line, as sample size increases to
45 participants per condition the estimated success probability
increases to a maximum value of 0.753. For sample sizes larger
than 45 the estimated probability of all the tests being successful
decreases because the tests that should produce non-significant
outcomes start to produce significant outcomes. The net result is
that, based on the knowledge we have about the means, standard
deviations, and correlations from the original experiments, large
sample experiments will be unlikely to successfully replicate the
full set of findings.
Three of the other experiments in Eberhardt et al. (2004)
used only significant outcomes as the basis of their theoretical
claims, so larger samples should only increase the probability
of replication success. In the large sample limit, the success
probability should be 1.0, if the effects are real. However, the
claims from study 5 in Eberhardt et al. (2004) depended on both
significant and non-significant outcomes from the hypothesis
tests. Similar to Figure 3, simulated experiments suggest that the
maximum possible success probability for study 5 is 0.465, which
occurs for 45 participants in each of four conditions.
Thus, based on the statistics reported by Eberhardt et al.
(2004), if a scientist attempts to replicate all five experiments,
the best chance of getting the same pattern (significance and
non-significance) of results as the original studies is to use very
large sample sizes for studies 2–3 (to give a power close to 1.0)
and sample sizes of 45 for every condition in studies 1 and 5.
The resulting estimated probability of success across all 5 studies
would be 0.753×1.0×1.0×1.0×0.465 = 0.348, whichmeans that
even with optimal sample sizes, there is approximately a one in
three chance that a replication of all the studies in Eberhardt et al.
(2004) would be fully successful. This seems like rather low odds
to motivate a set of replication studies that need several hundred
participants.
It may be that the means, standard deviations, and
correlations reported by Eberhardt et al. (2004) are not similar
to the population values. If so, then researchers need other
information (perhaps from other studies or from other theories)
to identify sample sizes that would be a good test of the
theoretical claims in Eberhardt et al. (2004). An even better
approach might be to design entirely new types of studies
to investigate these issues. Direct replication is not always an
appropriate method to test scientific ideas (see also Rotello et al.,
2015). A fruitful approach is to design experiments to address
different criteria than standard hypothesis testing approaches.
For example, Bayesian analysis methods can identify evidential
support for the null hypothesis (e.g., Rouder et al., 2009), so
increasing sample sizes inevitably leads to evidential clarity.
CONCLUSIONS
Several commentaries on previous TES analyses have suggested
that the TES analysis is unfair (Galak and Mayvis, 2012;
Elliot and Maier, 2013; Spellman, 2015), does not answer a
relevant question (Simonsohn, 2012, 2013; Morey, 2013; Fabrigar
and Wegener, 2016), or has been misapplied (Balcetis and
Dunning, 2012; Johnson, 2013; Dias and Ressler, 2014; van
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FIGURE 3 | Each colored line shows the estimated probability of success as a function of sample size for a test from study 1 of Eberhardt et al. (2004).
The black line shows the estimated success probability for all of the tests. Each point is based on 10,000 simulated experiments.
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Boxtel and Koch, 2016). The concerns about fairness largely
reflect misinterpreting a scientific critique as a personal attack
(Francis, 2013b,c, 2016a). It is true that some problems identified
by a TES analysis may reflect editorial decisions rather than
the wishes of the authors, but identifying responsibility for
such decisions is a distinct issue that is not resolved by a TES
analysis. Concerns about whether the TES answers a relevant
question reflect improperly drawn inferences from an analysis of
a single article to the general field and misunderstandings about
the interpretation of the TES analysis (Francis, 2012b, 2013a,b,
in press), especially regarding the relation between reported data
and theoretical claims. Concerns about possible misapplications
of the TES involve the selection of hypothesis tests that are used
to determine success. As discussed above, such selection is based
on the reported claims of the original authors, so it is fairly easy
to check whether the TES has been applied properly in this regard
(Francis, 2012c, 2013a,b, 2016b).
It can be unpleasant to critique articles that are the result
of substantial effort by scientists who presumably made a
good faith effort to scientifically investigate an important topic.
Nevertheless, such critiques are necessary for important topics
such as racial bias because good scientific investigations would
add valuable insight that could be used in policy decisions and
training programs. In contrast, poor scientific investigations,
however well intentioned, have the potential to cause true harm.
The problems with the findings in Eberhardt et al. (2004) are
hardly unique to psychology (e.g., Ioannidis and Trikalinos, 2007;
Francis, 2014b), but some psychologists are actively improving
scientific practice. Such efforts include the Many Labs Project
(Klein et al., 2014), which explores variability in replication
studies across different laboratories; the Reproducibility Project
(Open Science Collaboration, 2015), which empirically examined
replication success across a set of important findings; promotion
and development of software for Bayesian data analysis methods
(Rouder et al., 2009; Kruschke, 2010); encouraging data-sharing
to enable re-analysis (Nosek et al., 2012); promoting pre-
registration of experimental designs and planned analyses (Jonas
and Cesario, 2015); and utilizing meta-analytic methods to
combine data from multiple underpowered studies (Simonsohn
et al., 2014; van Assen et al., 2015). None of these approaches
solve all of the problems in the field because science is an
inherently difficult endeavor; but keeping these approaches in
mind is an important part of improving scientific practice.
Ultimately, good science derives from deep understanding, clever
design, careful measurement and analysis, and full honesty about
the findings and their limitations.
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